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TWO POLITICI ATIONS OF U S ANTITRUST
LAW
Frank Pasquale* & Jacqueline Green**
Discussions of the politicization of antitrust in the Trump era are
remarkably common. Reviewing antitrust policy from 2017 to 2021, critics
have accused the Trump Department of Justice (DOJ) and Trump-appointeechaired Federal Trade Commission (FTC) of populism, deviating from the
more technocratic standards that governed agency interventions during the
Bush and Obama eras. Critics have applied the broad brush of politicization
charges to the administration’s handling of a wide variety of topics, ranging
from marijuana and media mergers, to automaker acquiescence to state
environmental standards, to landmark lawsuits against Google and Facebook.
But a more discerning eye is necessary here.
The Trump era in fact saw two very distinctive types of politicization of
antitrust: one authoritarian, the other, democratic. In several situations, the
President appeared to eagerly use competition law, as he did with so many
other levers of governance, to reward his allies and punish his enemies,
without respecting extant norms of legal regularity and expert views. This is
a classic mark of an authoritarian (and specifically oligarchic and
patrimonialist) administration: a single-minded obsession with entrenching
one’s own political power by reducing the wealth and opportunities of one’s
actual or perceived enemies, while augmenting that of oneself or one’s allies.
The law is a mere means to an end in such administrations, to be wielded like
a weapon in the pursuit, acquisition, and maintenance of power.
However, at the same time this authoritarian politicization was
underway, a second, democratic impulse informed policymakers. At least
since the mid-2000s, scholars and activists had warned that the enormous
power of large, monopolistic internet platforms was distorting commerce and
the public sphere.1 The FTC almost took action against Google during the
Obama Administration, but ultimately closed the critical parts of its
investigation without fully explaining itself.2 This quietism was presented at
*

Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. We wish to offer our sincere thanks to the participants
and organizers at the 2019 BJCFL Symposium on Antitrust and Consumer Law, and particularly to
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Elizabeth Porfido.
**
J.D. Expected 2021, Brooklyn Law School.
1. See Zephyr Teachout, Antitrust Law, Freedom, and Human Development, 41 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1081, 1100 (2019); Testimony of Frank Pasquale before the Judiciary Committee of the House
of Representatives, Hearing on Competition on the Internet (July 15, 2008). As a report of the
Judiciary Committee observed at the time, “Recent transactions and near-transactions among
Google, Inc., Yahoo, Inc., and Microsoft Corp. had raised a number of concerns regarding their
possible anticompetitive effects in such areas as online advertising, online search, and web platform
interoperability. The hearing examined the state of competition with respect to competition in these
various online markets.” Id.
2. RANA FOROOHAR, DON’T BE EVIL: HOW BIG TECH BETRAYED ITS FOUNDING
PRINCIPLES—AND ALL OF US (New York: Currency Press, 2019); Frank Pasquale, Paradoxes of
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the time as a logical outgrowth of objective antitrust policy. However, as the
European Commission and other jurisdictions around the world took on U.S.
internet giants, American competition agencies’ lassitude began to look more
like industry capture or protectionism than resolute adherence to objective
standards.3 U.S. think tanks like the Open Markets Institute, the Institute for
Local Self-Reliance, the American Economic Liberties Project, and others
brought together those harmed by massive internet firms and the experts
capable of articulating and theorizing that harm. This is exactly what
democratic politics should look like: a bottom-up expression of concern
about the power of massive firms, which enriches academic work in the field,
and eventually sways key appointees in the Department of Justice and
Federal Trade Commission to take action.
Thus, competition law during the Trump Administration was politicized,
but in two diametrically opposed ways. This should not be surprising, since
politics itself has culminated in some of humanity’s highest ideals and some
of its worst abuses. To delineate and explore this dichotomy, this article has
two main parts. Part I explores authoritarian aspects of Trumpian competition
policy. Part II examines the democratization of high technology antitrust
evidenced in several Google and Facebook antitrust cases. The conclusion,
Part III, explores ways of further promoting democratization of antitrust
enforcement priorities, while preventing authoritarian misapplication of the
law.
I

TROU LIN POLITICI ATION OF TRUMPIAN
COMPETITION POLICY IN T E CANNA IS, MEDIA, AND
AUTOMOTI E SECTORS

Several episodes in merger enforcement during the Trump
Administration led to deep concerns about the politicization of investigations
into mergers in the media and cannabis industries, and into auto industry
agreements to reduce pollution. The most well-developed claims addressed
what appeared to many experts to be excessive documentation requirements
(Second Requests) for cannabis mergers. An insider’s whistleblower
complaint contained detailed accusations, leaders in the Department
responded, and many experts weighed in on the conflict. Part A below details
experts’ critiques of the Trump policies here. This politicization will be the
subject of Parts A through D below, where we weigh both critiques and
defenses of the relevant Department actions, and find the critiques are
consistently more compelling. Part E applies the same method to explore the
media and auto industry complaints. In sum, an authoritarian politicization is
Digital Antitrust: Why the FTC Failed to Explain Its Inaction on Search Bias, HARV. J. OF L. &
TECH. 1-2 (Occasional Papers Series, 2013).
3. Frank Pasquale, When Antitrust Becomes Pro-Trust: The Digital Deformation of U.S.
Competition Policy, COMP. POL’Y INT’L ANTITRUST CHRON. (May 14, 2017),
https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2620&context=fac_pubs.
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entirely consistent with key decision-making processes in these
investigations.
We should note at the outset of this Part that we do not think it necessary
to demonstrate complete coincidence between the aims, style, and methods
of certain projects of Trumpian antitrust, and the behavior patterns of regimes
like 2020s Russia, Venezuela, and Hungary, which may be classed as idealtypical contemporary authoritarian polities. 4 Rather, we focus on the
particular agency at issue (the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division)
with respect to particularly noted scenarios. It is not necessary to demonstrate
that an administration as a whole is authoritarian, in order to conclude that
some aspects of its behavior have authoritarian characteristics, style, or tone.
Rather, the key is to make a case that certain contested decisions go beyond
the ordinary rough and tumble of political prioritization of agency
enforcement decisions, into a realm of legal unreason to the extent they are
explicable mainly as an effort to punish enemies and reward friends. This
dualism is reminiscent of Carl Schmitt’s classic friend/enemy distinction—a
division that is not descriptive of politics as such (as Schmitt would have it),
but rather, of a particularly destructive and divisive illiberalism characteristic
of authoritarian regimes.5
A

OUSE UDICIARY COMMITTEE IN ESTI ATION AND ITS
AFTERMAT

Critical revelations of improper practices appeared in June 2020, when
John Elias, a member of the Department of Justice (DOJ)’s Antitrust Division
(ATR), was subpoenaed to testify before Congress. 6 The subpoena was
issued as part of the House Judiciary Committee’s (Committee)
investigations into whether the DOJ has been improperly politicized under
Attorney General (AG) William Barr and the Trump Administration.7 Elias
was subpoenaed to testify because he had issued a whistleblower complaint
calling attention to the ATR’s issuance of Second Requests to ten cannabis
firms who wished to merge.8 Elias charged that the Second Requests were

4. For a discussion of ideal-typical contemporary authoritarian polities, see Larry Diamond,
Marc F. Plattner, & Christopher Walker, editors, AUTHORITARIANISM GOES GLOBAL: THE
CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY (2016).
5. For more analysis on the parallels between Bill Barr’s approach to running the Department
of Justice and that of the “crown jurist of the Third Reich,” see Tamsin Shaw, William Barr: The
Carl Schmitt of Our Time, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.nybooks.com/daily/
2020/01/15/william-barr-the-carl-schmitt-of-our-time/.
6. Ciara Linnane, Attorney General Barr ordered antitrust probes of 10 cannabis mergers,
because he dislikes the industry, prosecutor says, MKT. WATCH (June 26, 2020), https://
www.marketwatch.com/story/attorney-general-barr-ordered-antitrust-probes-of-10-cannabismergers-because-he-dislikes-the-industry-prosecutor-says-2020-06-24.
7. Id.
8. Testimony of John W. Elias U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary, JUST SECURITY (June
24, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/john-w-elias-testimony-
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“not bona fide antitrust investigations,” yet accounted for “29% of the
[ATR]’s full-review merger investigations in the Fiscal Year 2019.” 9
Specifically, Elias stated that his supervisors had improperly used their
powers in the investigations at issue, directed by Barr, and solely because the
AG did not like the cannabis industry.10 In his testimony, he described how
these ten investigations consumed the ATR’s resources, “making up nearly a
third of all of its cases” that fiscal year, and he stated that even his
superordinate, Makan Delrahim, the head of the ATR, “acknowledged at an
all-staff meeting that the cannabis industry [was] unpopular ‘on the fifth
floor,’ [in] reference to [AG] Barr’s offices.”11 At the Committee hearing,
comments from representatives such as Jerold Nadler painted a picture of AG
Barr as using the DOJ “as a weapon to serve the president’s petty, private
interests.”12
Ryan Goodman, a journalist for Just Security, investigated the
whistleblower complaint made by Elias and another unnamed whistleblower
regarding the ATR. 13 The complaint itself detailed how Barr directed the
ATR to open investigations against the cannabis industry, “without sufficient
factual basis and ‘centered not on antitrust analysis,’ but instead due to the
[AG’s] ‘personal dislike of the industry.’”14 Following that complaint, the
DOJ’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) issued a rejection letter
indicating that it would not open an investigation pursuant to the complaint.15
Goodman focused his investigation on the OPR’s response to the complaint,
soliciting assessments of it from eleven leading antitrust experts. 16
Ultimately, Goodman found that “every one of the eleven experts was
alarmed by the underlying allegations and several were highly critical of the
OPR’s handling of the matter.”17 Three of those experts explicitly indicated

house-judiciary-committee-june-24-2020.pdf. He also testified regarding an investigation into four
automakers who had separately entered into agreements with the state of California. See id.
9. Linnane, supra note 6 (internal quotations omitted).
10. Nicholas Fandos, Katie Benner & Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. Officials Outline Claims of
Politicization Under Barr, N.Y. TIMES (updated July 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/06/24/us/politics/justice-department-politicization.html.
11. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
12. Id.
13. Just Security is supported by New York University School of Law, Open Society
Foundations, Atlantic Philanthropies, and others. It serves as an online forum for the “rigorous
analysis of U.S. national security law and policy.” About Us, Just Security (last visited Feb. 8, 2021),
https://www.justsecurity.org/about-us/
14. Ryan Goodman, 11 Top Antitrust Experts Alarmed by Whistleblower Complaint Against
A.G. Barr- and Office of Professional Responsibility’s Opinion, JUST SECURITY (June 26, 2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/71059/top-antitrust-lawyers-assess-john-elias-whistleblowercomplaint-against-a-g-barr-including-office-of-professional-responsibilitys-letter/.
15. Memorandum, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, JUST
SECURITY (June 11, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/oprmemorandum-from-jeffrey-ragsdale-to-bradley-weinsheimer-june-11-2020.pdf.
16. Goodman, supra note 14.
17. Id. (emphasis in original).
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that the OPR’s analysis was flawed, and lacked the power to persuade. 18
Specifically, Jonathan B. Baker, Research Professor of Law at American
University, Washington College of Law opined that the “OPR’s cursory
analysis and conclusions threaten to undermine merger enforcement
specifically and antitrust enforcement more broadly.” 19 The experts’
critiques suggested that the DOJ did not merely advance the President’s
political aims within the bounds of accepted law, but instead ran roughshod
over long-standing and obvious legal constraints on enforcement discretion.
The OPR’s letter in response to the whistleblowers’ complaint described
the whistleblowers’ allegations as follows: (1) that the ATR “conduct[ed]
pretextual investigations of, and plac[ed] onerous demands on, merging
companies in the cannabis industry through the issuance of Second Requests,
even though such mergers presented no competitive concerns,” and (2) that
the “ATR, at the direction of the [AG’s] Office, placed these demands on
merging cannabis companies in order to slow the growth of the cannabis
industry due to the DOJ leadership’s animosity toward the industry.”20 First,
the ATR denied the allegations, and argued that even if the allegations made
were true, that those “alleged facts would not violate any relevant laws,
regulations, rules, policies, or guidelines.”21 Then, the OPR agreed with the
ATR’s interpretation of its own power to issue Second Requests, finding that
“ATR’s Second Requests would not have violated any relevant laws,
regulations, rules, policies, or guidelines.”22
Goodman’s investigation into the complaint and the OPR’s response
asked the “highly respected experts” to compare Elias’ allegations with the
OPR’s response letter—and yielded consistent responses. Some themes
emerged across the experts’ opinions, all of which supported allegations that
the ATR had acted in a politicized manner: (1) the firms at issue represented
a small market share, and in one proposed merger represented a market share
of only 0.35 percent and thus posed minimal risk, if any, to competition, (2)
the ATR’s actions were violative of its own manual which states that Second
Requests should only be issued if serious concerns are first raised about the
anticompetitive nature of a transaction, i.e. a threshold concern must be
demonstrated, (3) the high volume of Second Requests issued in
investigations (ten) was not supported by the ATR’s contention that it needed
experience in an area of the law in which it was unfamiliar (cannabis), and
(4) the OPR’s letter reviewed written submissions only from the ATR and

18.
19.
20.
21.

See id.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id. This is a truly remarkable assertion of the agency’s ability to stand “above the law.” It is
one thing to assert that a clearly illegal act is non-justiciable or irremediable. It is quite another to
claim the right to burden persons and companies with costly investigations based solely on the
investigators’ animosity, with no proper legal basis.
22. Id.
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the whistleblowers, rather than interviewing any witnesses who could explain
why the ATR opened the investigations and whether there was improper
motive.23
While the cannabis mergers are perhaps the most salient example of this
overt antitrust politicization by the Trump Administration, the cannabis
mergers do not represent the only instance where the DOJ seems to have been
so crassly motivated that its actions shaded over into the authoritarian
hypostatization of one leader and party’s agenda, as opposed to democratic
expression of popular will be properly respectful of extant legal professional
and legal safeguards. In the whistleblower complaint itself, the issue was
raised of whether the DOJ had proper motives for examining four automakers
who had separately entered into agreements with California. In that case, an
irrational enthusiasm for fossil fuel burning seemed far more explanatory
than any genuine competitive concerns. Comparably, the DOJ quickly
approved a Disney-Fox merger, which stood in contrast to its nearly two-year
investigation and failed lawsuit attempting to block the AT&T/Time Warner
merger. Had both mergers sailed through, or been blocked, the Trump DOJ
could at least assert an ideological consistency. The differential treatment
raises the red flag of politicization, grounded in Trump’s own increasingly
unhinged words and actions.
ERY SMALL MARKET S ARES OF TAR ETED CANNA IS FIRMS

Typically, red flags are raised in the antitrust context where a merger
between two firms would result in a problematically high share of the
relevant market, or when there are bona fide monopolization concerns. Elias’
testimony indicated that the cannabis mergers involved “low market shares
in a fragmented industry,” and thus, did not meet the “established criteria”
for searching antitrust investigations.24 High market shares, he testified, are
a “key indicator” weighing in favor of issuing Second Requests – and those
high market shares are typically in the “double-digit[s].” 25 Michael A.
Carrier, a distinguished Professor at Rutgers Law School responded to
Goodman’s request for expert input by noting that the history of Second
Requests demonstrates that only the “most concerning mergers . . . rais[ing]
the most competitive concern” receive Second Requests, and are reflected in
“high market shares.”26 In this instance, a disproportionate number of Second
Requests were issued to proposed mergers that “based on longstanding
bipartisan antitrust principles, [did] not threaten competitive harm” due to the
firms representing a small post-merger market share. Indeed, two of the
targeted firms would become a mere 0.35 percent market share post-

23.
24.
25.
26.

See id.
Testimony of John W. Elias, supra note 8.
Id.
Goodman, supra note 14.
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merger.27 This strongly suggests an extra-legal basis for the issuance of these
Second Requests was AG Barr’s dislike for the cannabis industry.28
Eleanor Fox, Walter J. Derenberg Professor of Trade Regulation at New
York University School of Law felt similarly. She highlighted the fact that
the ATR “undertook full scale reviews of 10 proposed mergers in the
cannabis industry, although the mergers were of very small firms in a very
fragmented market and there was no way they could create market power.”29
To defend the Trump ATR, its director at the time responded to concerns
about market share by stating that “market shares alone, are not a substitute
for preliminary investigation into competitive effects.” 30 When deciding
whether to open the investigation, he said that the ATR faced “matters of first
impression,” mainly “whether the antitrust laws could or should be applied
to protect and promote lower prices and increased output of a substance that
is facially illegal under federal law.”31 But these arguments ignore that even
if there is some novelty in dealing with the cannabis market, the specific
purpose of the merger review is to prevent market power from accumulating.
Expansive investigative powers in this context must be grounded in some
realistic theory of an antitrust problem, but none appeared to exist here.
As Darren Tucker has observed in empirical research on second requests,
“the vast majority of markets for which staff recommended a Second Request
were highly concentrated post-merger. Of the 129 markets studied, 121, or
94 percent, exceeded the 1,500/100 concentration screen, and 113, or 88
percent, exceeded the 2,500/200 concentration screen described in Section
5.3 of the 2010 Guidelines.”32 Merger policy did not change enough between
the Obama and Trump administrations to merit the type of massive change
of approach that could have led to the marijuana investigations, which no
Trump Administration official suggested came close to those typical scores
based on market share. It is usually “double-digit [market shares] which
normally cause[] antitrust concern,” not the 0.35% share that was the stakes
of one of the mergers that led to a second request.33
More speculatively, Delrahim also raised the issue of timing. Due to
cannabis’ status as a Schedule 1 controlled substance which carries sanctions
such as “up to five years in prison and fines up to $1 million” for its growth,
marketing, or distribution, Delrahim indicated the ATR felt fear of
prosecution under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) would deter parties
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Darren S. Tucker, A Survey of Evidence Leading to Second Requests at the FTC, 78
ANTITRUST L. J. 591, 601 (2013).
33. Diane Bartz, Lawmakers split along party lines on Justice Department’s pot probes,
REUTERS (June 24, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-justice-cannabis/lawmakerssplit-along-party-lines-on-justice-departments-pot-probes-idUSKBN23V32Z
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from cooperating voluntarily with the ATR.34 This supposedly contributed to
the ATR’s desire to review cannabis mergers with an eye to potential lack of
cooperation in the future. 35 Roger Alford’s 36 response echoed Delrahim’s
contention that cannabis companies were reluctant to provide any
information at all for fear of being prosecuted under the CSA.37 This, Alford
said, is not surprising “[g]iven that both the Obama and Trump
Administrations made clear that the mass commercialization of the sale and
distribution of marijuana could implicate companies in criminal violations
under the [CSA].” 38 However, this logic would appear to bootstrap all
manner of civil investigative demands of the cannabis industry. Any agency
with any speculative interest in potential regulation or administrative
adjudication could suddenly demand paperwork in the interest of evidence
preservation. Such a broad rationale does not seem capable of
universalization in a non-authoritarian context, where there is supposed to be
some tangible and proximate relationship between investigative burdens and
their actual bases.
Professor Christopher Sprigman has also questioned Delrahim and
Alford’s contentions that timing and the “reluctance of the parties to hand
DOJ information that could potentially be used to prosecute them under
federal criminal law” justified the ATR’s actions.39 The DOJ argued their
hands were tied—that they had no choice but to issue Second Requests, as
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR) only gives the DOJ 30 days to issue them.40
There was a simple fix for this timing problem, Professor Sprigman says:
If the concern really was the 30-day clock, there is a simple way to handle
that. When Antitrust Division lawyers are concerned that the 30-day clock
is about to run and they haven’t been able to fully assess whether a Second
Request makes sense in a particular deal, they will simply call up the parties
and ask them to pull their filing and refile later (with any fees for the refiling waived). Merging parties usually take that deal, because if they don’t,
a Second Request will almost certainly issue, and the delay opens up a
conversation between the parties and the Division about how a Second
Request can be avoided. Based on information that’s been provided to me
by others, the Division did offer a “pull-and-refile” deal to avoid the 30-day
clock on the MedMan/PharmaCann deal (i.e., the first of the cannabis

34. Letter from Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dept. Just. Antitrust Div., to
Chairman Jerold Nadler & Ranking Member Jim Jordan, Comm. on Judiciary, at 3 (July 1, 2020)
https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000173-0d14-dd78-a9ff-7fb6e2a70000.
35. Id. at 4.
36. Roger Alford was the Deputy Assistant AG from 2017 to 2019 under AAG Delrahim.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Christopher Sprigman, What’s Missing in Current and Former Officials’ Responses to DOJ
Antitrust Whistleblower, JUST SECURITY (July 16, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/71450/
whats-missing-in-current-and-former-officials-responses-to-doj-antitrust-whistleblower/.
40. Id.
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mergers). So a concern about the 30-day deadline would not be a reason to
issue a Second Request in that case.41

Professor Sprigman is also skeptical of Delrahim and Alford’s contention
that the ATR was forced to issue Second Requests because cannabis
companies were “unwilling or unable” to provide information that would
confirm that the mergers did not threaten competition.42 Professor Sprigman
notes that the parties at issue were represented by “sophisticated antitrust
counsel,” who knew that the law gives the DOJ power to obtain information
and to block mergers completely where necessary.43 Professor Sprigman also
highlighted that cannabis legalization has been around in one form or another
since 1996, and that “nothing the merging parties would be likely to give the
ATR through the H-S-R process [would be something] that the feds couldn’t
compel by ordinary criminal process,” if they wished.44
C FAILURE TO ARTICULATE A T RES OLD CONCERN OF
ANTICOMPETITI E RISK EYOND MARKET S ARE
Concern about present market share may not be necessary to a Second
Request; other legitimate concerns may drive such document requests.
However, ATR failed to make a convincing case that these other legitimate
concerns arose in the context of the cannabis mergers. Several of the experts
queried by Goodman noted their suspicion as to whether the ATR had found
a threshold concern of anticompetitive practices present before issuing the
Second Requests. Multiple experts cited to the ATR’s operating manual,
noting that the manual itself required a threshold concern of anticompetitive
harm to be met before demanding a more searching investigation—and they
failed to see such concerns here. One expert, a former ATR attorney,
explained that the ATR manual instructs that “Second Requests should be
issued only when ‘a transaction might raise competitive problems and more
information is needed to evaluate it.’”45 In such an instance, the ATR manual
instructs that the Second Request should be “tailor[ed] . . . to the transaction
and its possible anticompetitive consequences.”46 Stuart M. Gerson, a former
Acting AG of the United States, AAG, and Assistant U.S. Attorney stated
that, “[a]s an ethical and substantive matter, it is certainly unacceptable to
pursue a second request without reason to believe the underlying transaction
might violate the antitrust laws.”47

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Goodman, supra note 14.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
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Bill Baer,48 former AAG in charge of the ATR49 and former director
of the Bureau of Competition at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 50
echoed the point that the ATR’s operating manual demands that before even
a preliminary investigation is opened, “the staff must determine whether
there is reason to believe there is an antitrust violation worth looking at.”51
Baer recounted that in his experience at the DOJ and FTC, he had never seen
a Second Request issued, nor even recommended, if there was no
demonstration of an “underlying antitrust risk.”52 In this instance regarding
the cannabis industry, Baer identified that the OPR’s ostensibly exculpatory
memo does not indicate whether this threshold inquiry was met—and further
questioned the ATR’s processes wondering, “[d]id they even ask?”53
Similarly, Professor Baker observed that ATR policy “require[s] staff to
identify potential theories of competitive harm from a merger, based on a
preliminary investigation” before a Second Request can be recommended.54
Here, Professor Baker observes, the DOJ recommended detailed
investigations into ten proposed mergers while it lacked any “plausible theory
of competitive harm.” 55 Not only did the firms under investigation have
“trivial market shares,” but in two cases the merging firms “did not even
compete.” 56 Christopher Sprigman, a Professor of Law at New York
University School of Law and former DOJ ATR attorney again cited the
manual, which dictates that “staff drives the Second Request process . . .
Second Requests are issued only where there is some chance that a proposed
merger would cause competitive harm in a well-defined antitrust market.”57
Sprigman also raised the concern that the ATR had not, at any time,
“formulated a possible theory of how these mergers would harm
competition.” 58 Douglas Melamed, Professor of the Practice of Law at
Stanford Law School framed the issue focusing on pure administrative law:
Law enforcement agencies may properly use their powers to investigate
only if there is a reasonable basis to believe that the investigation will
uncover violations of the laws the agencies are authorized to enforce, and

48. Mr. Baer authored his own op-ed about the situation. See Bill Baer, Think the DOJ’s
Antitrust Division is immune from political meddling? Think again., WASH. POST (June 24, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/24/think-dojs-antitrust-division-is-immunepolitical-meddling-think-again/.
49. Mr. Baer was former assistant AG in charge of the ATR from 2013 to 2016.
50. Mr. Baer was the former director of the Bureau of Competition at the FTC from 1995 to
1999.
51. Goodman, supra note 14.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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the scope and burdens of the investigation should be limited to [] those
reasonably necessary for that purpose.59

Harry First, Charles L. Denison Professor of Law at NYU School of Law,
brought attention to the fact that the ATR and FTC make Second Requests
very rarely, compromising “just about 2% of all notified mergers in 2018—
45 in all.”60 Following the issuance of a Second Request, Professor First said,
a challenge to the merger is likely—yet in the cannabis merger investigations
the ATR did not challenge a single merger out of ten investigated.61
To defend ATR from these critiques, Delrahim repeatedly highlighted
the ATR’s “lack of experience” with the cannabis industry, noting how
industry experience helps the ATR “review transactions more quickly.” 62
Alford also echoed Delrahim’s statements regarding cannabis mergers being
a “matter of first impression in the history of the [DOJ].”63 Like Delrahim,
Alford felt that the ATR’s investigatory practices were necessary in relation
to the multiple questions implicated in this “first impression” context. 64
Specifically, Delrahim said he “made the judgment call that it was a worthy
use of the [ATR]’s resources to review in the most targeted and efficient way
possible a wave of similar transactions that followed in quick succession.”65
But the critical question is what was the specific competition law concern
that motivated the need to inquire into the market in the first place? That
appears unanswered to this day.
Diverse local circumstances may in theory be a reason why one cannabis
merger investigation was not a substitute for the subsequent investigations
which would follow, because “the sale of cannabis is subject of unique, statespecific regulatory and legal structures; because it cannot be transported
across state lines, learning about the industry in one state reveals nothing
about the likely competitive effects of a transaction in another.”66 But in at
least one case, this argument appeared to be completely inapplicable, as it
was reported that “the merging companies operated in different geographies
and didn’t compete at all.” 67 Professor Sprigman expressed skepticism
toward Delrahim and Alford’s position that the ATR needed to initiate all ten
investigations due to the “novel legal question” posed of whether the ATR

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Letter from Makan Delrahim, supra note 34, at 3.
Roger Alford, Regarding Those Marijuana Mergers: A Response to Accusers Who Question
the DOJ, JUST SECURITY (July 13, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/71295/regarding-thosemarijuana-mergers-a-response-to-accusers-who-question-the-doj/.
64. Id.
65. Letter from Makan Delrahim, supra note 34.
66. Id.
67. Dan Primack, Whistleblower: Barr Directed Faulty Antitrust Reviews of Marijuana
Mergers, AXIOS (June 24, 2020), https://www.axios.com/whistleblower-barr-directed-faultyantitrust-reviews-of-marijuana-mergers-e06c14ab-4122-47ce-acb9-6bac6f24d666.html

108

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 15

should apply antitrust laws at all.68 Professor Sprigman points to the sheer
number of burdensome processes issued (ten) to determine what “seems,
frankly, like an academic question.”69 The information that a Second Request
yields, Professor Sprigman said, would be unlikely to aid the ATR’s decision
about “whether to enforce the Clayton Act in these markets.”70
Furthermore, the antitrust policy question at issue is not entirely novel
according to Professor Sprigman.71 During his time at the ATR, Professor
Sprigman sat on a committee tasked with deciding when the ATR would
intervene as amicus in private antitrust cases.72 In one instance, a “series of
antitrust actions [were] brought by labor union health funds” against tobacco
companies.73 The ATR ultimately decided not to intervene, “not because [it]
thought that the tobacco industry should be immune from the antitrust laws—
and[, most notably] [it] did[not] need to issue Second Requests to reach a
decision on that question.”74
Similarly, Professor Sprigman did not find Delrahim and Alford’s
explanation that the ATR needed to build an understanding of the cannabis
industry satisfactory.75 Like his response to the “novel legal question” issue,
Professor Sprigman pointed to the fact that the ATR launched “ten merger
investigations in the cannabis industry in quick succession.” 76 He also
addressed the fact that the ATR “did not appear at any time to have
formulated a possible theory of how [those] mergers would harm
competition, and issuing Second Requests without a theory of possible
competitive harm is not how the [ATR] does business,” again citing to the
ATR manual.77 Professor Sprigman pointed out that neither Delrahim nor
Alford nor any other ATR employee had offered a theory of possible
competitive harm that might support the issuance of a Second Request.78 Nor
does it appear that the “novel industry” rationale as proffered, had any
limiting principle. It could justify any burdensome fishing expedition—a
particularly suspect enterprise given how much genuine concentration of
market power was occurring in the U.S. economy.79

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Sprigman, supra note 39.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
On this trend toward concentration, see Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin, Roni Michaely,
Are US industries becoming more concentrated?, 23 REVIEW OF FINANCE 697, 697 (2019) (“over
75% of US industries have experienced an increase in concentration levels” since the late 1990s);
THOMAS PHILIPPON, THE GREAT REVERSAL: HOW AMERICA GAVE UP ON FREE
MARKETS (2019).
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ATR tried to defend itself by claiming that the Second Requests had not
violated “any relevant laws, regulations, rules, policies, or guidelines.”80 But
this is closer to gaslighting than good faith argument, since the real question
is what laws, regulations, rules, policies, or guidelines would support the
plethora of Second Requests it authorized. It is black letter administrative law
that the burden of proof is on the proponent of an order; certainly some
analogous requirement of sound legal foundation applies to a situation like a
second request.81 Simply put, as Professor Sprigman observes, the OPR’s
exoneration of ATR wrongly suggested that there is nothing wrong with an
AG directing Second Requests to be made “even in instances where a merger
presents no antitrust concern and the intent is purely to harass companies that
the AG dislikes.”82 This, he said, is antithetical to everything he knows about
“how antitrust enforcement, merger investigations, and, in particular, the
Second Request process, are supposed to work.”83
D DISPARATE TREATMENT OF MEDIA MER ERS WIT OUT A
CON INCIN POLICY RATIONALE
Nor were the cannabis mergers the only example of such troubling
politicization.
Serious concerns were also raised about the ATR’s treatment of the
AT&T/Time Warner merger that was first announced in 2016. In November
2017, the DOJ sued to block the proposed merger.84 The DOJ reported that
its concern was that the combined company would charge high fees to
distribute Time Warner content, generating an “unfair advantage to AT&Towned DirecTV.” 85 Insisting their efforts were in good-faith, one DOJ
official said that their investigation had found the merger would harm
competition by resulting in higher bills for consumers and stifling
innovation.86 That same DOJ official “denied that ownership of CNN was a
factor in the DOJ’s thinking,” and stated that Trump had no influence over
the DOJ’s decision to sue.87 However, during his campaign for the presidency
80. Sprigman, supra note 39 (internal quotations omitted).
81. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2015). Animus has been identified by courts as an illegitimate ground for
administrative action. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973) (citing Moreno
v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 n.11 (D.D.C. 1972) (“[a] purpose to discriminate
against hippies cannot, in and of itself and without reference to [some independent] considerations
in the public interest, justify the 1971 amendment” to nutritional assistance guidelines challenged
in the case.)).
82. Sprigman, supra note 39.
83. Id.
84. Steven Overly, Trump administration sues to block AT&T-Time Warner merger, POLITICO
(Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/11/20/trump-lawsuit-att-time-warnermerger-250956#:~:text=The%20Justice%20Department%20filed%20a,President%20Donald%
20Trump’s%20media%20criticism.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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Trump had said that he would block the merger of CNN and AT&T simply
because he despised CNN.88 Sources familiar with the proposed merger had
reported that the DOJ “gave the companies an ultimatum to either sell Time
Warner’s Turner Broadcasting, which includes CNN . . . or shed satellite
television provider DirecTV.” 89 DOJ officials gave a different story,
indicating the companies themselves offered to sell CNN in order to push the
deal through. 90 AT&T’s CEO Randall Stephenson rejected the DOJ’s
account, stating his company had no intentions of selling or offering to sell
CNN.91
Prior to the lawsuit, AT&T felt confident that the government would
approve the merger due to its nature as a “vertical” merger, one that does not
eliminate a competitor from the market.92 In October 2016 Delrahim himself,
prior to his nomination by Trump, said the merger “did not seem to pose a
major antitrust problem.” 93 Thus, when the lawsuit was filed, critics
questioned why the conservative DOJ would take “what would traditionally
be a more liberal position on the merger.”94 The DOJ remained adamant in
claiming politics had no role in their decision to file suit, emboldened by an
affidavit submitted by Delrahim stating the same.95
Ultimately, the DOJ lost its suit in June of 2018 and filed an appeal in
July.96 Though to some, the proceedings reeked of political influence, others
like Jonathan Jacobson (chair of the American Bar Association’s antitrust
division) felt that the ATR acted independently of the White House. 97
Jacobson felt that Delrahim made his decision to sue “based on what he
believes,” noting that Delrahim has a different fundamental approach to

88. Hadas Gold, AT&T brings Trump back into Justice Department’s antitrust case, CNN
MONEY
(Sept.
20,
2018),
https://money.cnn.com/2018/09/20/media/att-doj-appealbrief/index.html; Mr. Trump stated in a speech in 2016 that he would block the deal and tweeted
about his distaste for CNN frequently. One such tweet, within weeks of the lawsuit at issue, said
that he was “‘forced’ to watch CNN while in the Philippines and ‘again realized how bad, and
FAKE, it is. Loser!’” Overly, supra note 84. His animus continued throughout his administration,
including ham-handed efforts to shame the network for covering his world-historically inept and
malevolent mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic. Axios, Trump attacks CNN as “dumb
b*stards” for continuing to cover pandemic, AXIOS, Oct. 20, 2020, at https://www.axios.com/
trump-attacks-cnn-covid-9342befa-8790-42e6-b6e5-d8472d19ecec.html.
89. Overly, supra note 84.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. There are numerous traditional antitrust articles promoting the efficiencies of vertical
mergers. We take no position on their merit; we note only that the decision to block such a merger
is inconsistent with the traditional approach.
93. Id. (internal quotations omitted)
94. Gold, supra note 88.
95. Id.
96. Ariel Shapiro, Why the DOJ keeps going after the AT&T-Time Warner deal, CNBC (Aug.
6, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/06/why-the-doj-keeps-going-after-the-att-time-warnerdeal.html.
97. Id.

2020]

Two Politicizations of U.S. Antitrust Law

111

mergers than leaders from previous administrations.98 Whereas the Obama
Administration made use of behavioral remedies, such as including
stipulations in mergers that require or prohibit the acquiring company from
taking certain actions, Delrahim fundamentally opposed such remedies and
favored divestment.99
Defenses of the DOJ lost some of their luster in 2019, when the DOJ lost
their appeal in the D.C. Circuit by the decision of a unanimous court.100 Such
a loss is by no means proof of improper politicization; DOJ inevitably loses
some cases, and antitrust law is evolving. But it was then reported that Trump
had “personally asked a top White House aide to make sure the [DOJ]
stopped AT&T from purchasing Time Warner.”101 The report was unearthed
by Jane Mayer, an investigative journalist for the New Yorker, and she also
reported that a few months before the DOJ filed its lawsuit Trump “pressured
Gary Cohn, the former director of the National Economic Council, to tell the
[DOJ] to block [the] deal.”102 According to Mayer’s source, Trump asked
both Cohn and then Chief-of-Staff John Kelly to come to his office to express
his dismay that a lawsuit hadn’t been filed yet.103 Mayer’s source recounted
that after the meeting, Cohn told Kelly not to follow through with the
request.104
The proper degree of discretion of political appointees over the executive
branch is a topic of some controversy. The critical distinction is whether the
President or his top advisors had a generalizable policy reason for trying to
block the AT&T/TimeWarner merger, or merely had an animus against a
particular firm or division thereof. It is illegal for a President (or any federal
government official) to arrest, prosecute, or litigate against a particular
person or firm simply out of a political animus against them.105 But there may
98. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
99. Id.
100. Sara Salinas, AT&T’s merger with Time Warner will stand, after DOJ loses its appeal and
drops the case, CNBC (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/26/appeals-court-upholdsdecision-allowing-att-to-buy-time-warner.html.
101. Hadas Gold, Report: Trump asked Gary Cohn to block AT&T-Time Warner merger, CNN
BUS. (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/04/media/att-time-warner-trump-gary-cohn/
index.html.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (“To punish a person because [they have]
done what the law plainly allows [them] to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort.”).
Admittedly, animus can be difficult to prove. For example, in the context of the intentional tort of
malicious prosecution, plaintiffs must show “‘(1) the prosecutor harbored genuine animus toward
the defendant, or was prevailed upon to bring the charges by another with animus such that the
prosecutor could be considered a “stalking horse,” and (2) he would not have been prosecuted except
for the animus,’” in order to prevail on their claim. United States v. Koh, 199 F.3d 632, 640 (2d Cir.
1999) (quoting United States v. Aviv, 923 F.Supp. 35, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). Nevertheless, it has
been identified by courts as an illegitimate ground for administrative action. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973) (citing Moreno v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 345 F. Supp.
310, 314 n.11 (D.D.C. 1972) (“[a] purpose to discriminate against hippies cannot, in and of itself
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have been a larger political project at work here. Trump and other fauxpopulist Republicans, like Missouri Senator Joshua Hawley, have continually
railed against the media on purely political grounds (accusing them of
“liberal bias”) and out of a larger policy ideology (claiming to be defending
some vision of a level playing field). Given the often abusive and extractive
practices of cable and media companies, many Americans likely would want
to see government scrutinize their mergers more.
Thus, had the AT&T/TimeWarner merger been the only massive media
merger to come to the attention of the Trump DOJ, one could easily remain
agnostic as to whether troublingly authoritarian, or authentically democratic,
politicization had led to the merger challenge. However, another very large
media merger was met with exactly the opposite reaction from the
Trumpists—and the critical variables that changed seemed to be the persons
set to gain from the merger, and the political commitments of an owner of
one of the firms. In 2017, Trump publicly supported a deal for Disney to
acquire Fox film, television, and international business units. 106 It was
reported that Trump spoke with Rupert Murdoch, owner of Twenty-First
Century Fox, Inc. and congratulated him on the deal the day it was
announced. 107 Trump’s praise for Fox news at the time was publicly
recognized, and was almost certainly due to the “favorable coverage” that
Murdoch’s properties had given him.108 Though Fox News was not included
in the sale, the proposed acquisition would make the Murdoch family “the
largest individual shareholders in Disney, increasing their wealth by billions
of dollars.” 109 In the same report by Mayer which revealed Trump’s
conversation with Cohn and Kelly, she described how, under Trump, the
government “ha[d] consistently furthered Murdoch’s business interests, to
the detriment of his rivals.”110
This support from Trump stands in contrast to his animosity toward the
AT&T/Time Warner merger which stood to benefit CNN news, which he had
publicly rebuked.111 While the DOJ spent almost two years investigating the
AT&T/Time Warner merger, culminating in an unsuccessful lawsuit, the
DOJ announced approval for the Disney-Fox deal only six months after the
deal itself was announced.112 Furthermore, the approval “took about half the

and without reference to [some independent] considerations in the public interest, justify the 1971
amendment” to nutritional assistance guidelines challenged in the case.)).
106. Reuters Staff, Trump supports deal for Disney to acquire Fox film, TV units: White House,
REUTERS (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-fox-m-a-disney-trump/trumpsupports-deal-for-disney-to-acquire-fox-film-tv-units-white-house-idUSKBN1E82VP.
107. Id.
108. Id. Though the news channel is also owned by Murdoch, it was not included in the sale. Id.
109. The Editorial Board, The Disney-Fox Deal Sails Through, a Bit Too Easily, N.Y. TIMES
(July 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/01/opinion/disney-fox-deal.html.
110. Gold, supra note 88 (internal quotations omitted).
111. The Editorial Board, supra note 109. See Section III-b, infra.
112. The Editorial Board, supra note 109.
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time that regulators usually need” to evaluate deals as large as the DisneyFox deal ($71 billion).113 Other comparisons between the AT&T merger and
the Disney merger raised red flags supporting political animus. For example,
the AT&T merger featured a vertical integration, which tend to be approved
“as long as the merging companies agree not to take unfair advantage of their
market power.”114 On the other hand, the Disney merger featured a horizontal
merger, one which “antitrust regulators and judges are usually much more
dubious of.”115
Following accusations of politicization with regard to the disparate
treatment of the AT&T/Time Warner merger and the Disney/Fox merger, the
DOJ gave several justifications for their actions. Four main justifications for
the stark differences in treatment were offered: (1) the long, onerous process
of investigating and suing to block the AT&T/Time Warner merger as
compared with the quick, seamless process of rubber stamping the
Disney/Fox merger could be explained by antitrust timing principles, (2)
AT&T’s proposed merger with Time Warner would, indeed, likely harm
competition as predicted by well-known antitrust principles, (3) the decision
making process was completely apolitical in nature, and (4) AT&T/Time
Warner’s refusal to participate in divestitures in favor of adopting behavioral
conditions did not gel with DOJ leadership’s antitrust ideology, whereas
Disney/Fox were content to make those favored divestitures.
Delrahim responded to criticism regarding the “speedy approval” of the
Disney/Fox merger as compared with the AT&T/Time Warner merger which
took a significant amount of time and culminated in a lawsuit and subsequent
appeal.116 While the entire Disney-Fox investigation only took six months,
AT&T announced its plan to acquire Time Warner in October 2016 and the
DOJ sued to block that merger in November 2017.117 Delrahim noted that the
suit actually came “only eight months after the parties complied with the
[DOJ]’s formal requests for information relevant to the transaction,” and that
AT&T “knew within six months” of producing the relevant documentation
that the DOJ had anti-competitive concerns about what it saw. 118 The
merging parties have control over the expeditiousness, Delrahim said,
explaining that the “timing of their Hart-Scott-Rodino filings, as well as the
pace and timing of compliance with the [DOJ]’s information requests”

113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Dade Hayes, DOJ Antitrust Head: Fox-Disney Deal “A Victory For American Consumers,”
DEADLINE (July 13, 2018), https://deadline.com/2018/07/doj-antitrust-head-calls-fox-disney-dealvictory-for-american-consumers-1202426137/.
117. Makan Delrahim, A victory for American Consumers, WASH. TIMES (July 12, 2018),
https://m.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/jul/12/how-the-disney-fox-antitrust-settlementprotects-c/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery.
118. Id.
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dictates the pace of the review.119 As the “largest telecommunications merger
in history,” Delrahim contended that an objective observer could hardly find
this timing to be “outside the norm.”120
Insisting their efforts during the AT&T/Time Warner merger were in
good-faith, one DOJ official said that their investigation had found the
merger would harm competition by resulting in higher bills for consumers
and stifling innovation. 121 And DOJ and the FTC did promulgate a more
general (if modest) rethinking of vertical merger policy by the summer of
2020.122 By contrast, Daniel Petrocelli, counsel for AT&T during the DOJ
suit, argued that the media companies were being “singled out,” given the
DOJ’s adherence to classic consumer harm theories, and the faint case made
by them for such consumer harm. 123 Nonetheless, the DOJ claimed that
AT&T-Time Warner would have “increased leverage over distribution rivals,
ultimately leading to higher carriage fees for Turner content and higher prices
for consumers.” 124 It further demonstrated that in the past, AT&T and
DirecTV had expressed concerns to the FCC about a different vertical
merger, intending to show that the two companies had “acknowledged the
threat a combination of content and distribution can have to the competitive
landscape.”125
On the witness stand at trial, AT&T executives denied any incentive to
raise rivals’ costs. 126 The DOJ had also alleged that AT&T-Time Warner
“would ‘coordinate’ with Comcast to try to slow down the threat from
emerging streaming distributers, like SlingTV and Hulu,” though the DOJ
did not seem to have an economic model with which to prove its point.127
Evident in the DOJ’s loss at trial and loss again at the appeals stage, the
government “failed to prove that the merger would substantially lessen
competition,” or that AT&T would endeavor to leverage its ownership of
“premium content” to harm rivals. 128 Trial Judge Richard J. Leon of the
United States District Court in Washington voiced the thoughts of many
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
Overly, supra note 84.
The DOJ and FTC published new vertical merger guidelines which indicated a modest
increase in the level of vigilance the agencies would devote to the issue. However, both Democratic
commissioners dissented, calling the new guidelines too permissive. DOJ and FTC Finalize New
Vertical Merger Guidelines, VINSON & ELKINS (July 8, 2020), https://www.velaw.com/
insights/doj-and-ftc-finalize-new-vertical-merger-guidelines/.
123. Ted Johnson, AT&T-Time Warner Trial Puts Spotlight on Antitrust Chief’s View of Mergers,
VARIETY (Mar. 15, 2018), https://variety.com/2018/biz/news/att-time-warner-trial-controversy1202726979/.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. John Brodkin, Trump administration fails to block AT&T/Time Warner merger, ARS
TECHNICA (June 12, 2018), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/06/att-can-buy-time-warnerinc-judge-rules/.
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antitrust experts when he said: “the [DOJ]’s attempt to block AT&T’s
acquisition of Time Warner never made sense on the merits of the case.”129
To be sure, antitrust law may well need to expand to empower agencies
like ATR to more aggressively reviewed mergers like AT&T/Time Warner.
And we may never pin down a “smoking gun conversation” or “hot
documents” to prove ATR’s politicization here. But the actions of Trump
himself, especially set in the larger context of its disregard for settled norms
and laws, speak for themselves. 130 For example, while one DOJ official
denied that “ownership of CNN was a factor in the DOJ’s thinking,” and
stated that Trump had no influence over the DOJ’s decision to sue, Trump
himself constantly made threats against specific companies that angered him
(often simply by reporting on the disastrous consequences of his policies).131
During his campaign for the presidency Trump had said that he would block
the merger of CNN and AT&T simply because he did not like CNN. 132
Delrahim himself had said in 2016 that he “didn’t see a major problem with
the transaction,”133 and appeared to change course by 2017.
Nevertheless, Delrahim denied that Trump had ever been involved in the
DOJ’s operations with regard to the merger.134 Trump himself contended that
it was Delrahim’s decision, and not his, to try to block the merger.135 Yet
Rudolph Giuliani, a member of the Trump legal team, stated the President
“denied the merger.”136 After that statement, Giuliani attempted to correct
himself and say that he “hadn’t been properly informed,” and that the
President had told him directly that “he didn’t interfere.” 137 Delrahim
asserted that the DOJ was merely carrying out its duties of enforcement

129. Andrew Ross Sorkin, The Political Legacy of a Failed Challenge to the AT&T-Time Warner
Deal, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/12/business/dealbook/atttime-warner-legacy.html.
130. For more on this context, see MICHAEL LEWIS, THE FIFTH RISK (Doubleday, 2018); Tamsin
Shaw, William Barr: The Carl Schmitt of Our Time, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Jan. 15, 2020.
131. Overly, supra note 84.
132. Gold, supra note 88; Mr. Trump stated in a speech in 2016 that he would block the deal and
tweeted about his distaste for CNN frequently. One such tweet, within weeks of the lawsuit at issue,
said that he was “‘forced’ to watch CNN while in the Philippines and ‘again realized how bad, and
FAKE, it is. Loser!’” Overly, supra note 84.
133. Emily Stewart, The government is suing to block the AT&T-Time Warner deal, VOX (Nov.
20, 2017), 682262/att-time-warner-deal-doj-sues.
134. Michael J. de la Merced et. al., Justice Department Says Not So Fast to AT&T’s Time Warner
Bid, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/08/business/dealbook/att-timewarner.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=firstcolumn-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news.
135. Sorkin, supra note 129.
136. S.V. Date, Giuliani Says Cohen Never Spoke With Trump About His Big-Dollar Clients,
HUFFPOST (May 11, 2018), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/trump-giuliani-cohen-corporateclients_n_5af606e6e4b0e57cd9f979c7?ncid=engmodushpmg00000004. This was in response to
accusations that the President’s former lawyer may have been improperly influenced by having
AT&T as a client.
137. Sorkin, supra note 129.
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faithfully, without any regard to politics.138 He felt that a “major PR effort by
AT&T” in the case persuaded those “[un]familiar with antitrust law” that
politics were in play.139 Finally, Delrahim brought attention to the fact that
he received letters from a number of senators asking him to “block [the]
merger or do not do a behavioral remedy,” which in Delrahim’s eyes
amounted to bipartisan criticism about the proposed merger.140
Finally, the DOJ felt that the AT&T/Time Warner merger was
sufficiently distinct from the Disney/Fox merger in that the former only
seemed agreeable to behavioral remedies whereas the latter was willing to
make divestitures. Kimmelman noted that Delrahim and other conservatives
are notoriously unsupportive of mergers that are approved with behavioral
conditions, and “when faced with a problematic transaction . . . favor asset
sales, in large part because it washes the government’s hands of having to
exert oversight to make sure the conditions are followed.” 141 The DOJ
contended that it had offered AT&T and Time Warner options, such as
“[k]eep CNN and Turner Broadcasting but divest another part of AT&T like
DirecTV; keep all of AT&T but divest the Turner division, including CNN;
or allow partial ownership of Turner.”142 However, according to the DOJ, the
companies would only accept behavioral remedies, which consist of promises
not to engage in anticompetitive conduct. 143 In contrast, Delrahim said,
Disney and Fox were willing to “work cooperatively with the [ATR], offering
up the very types of divestitures which the [DOJ] could reasonably expect to
achieve through litigation,” and attributed the “efficient conclusion after six
months of review” to this cooperation.144
These are all valid points. Of all the ATR actions discussed in this Part,
the challenge to the AT&T/Time Warner merger comes closest to the
category of “democratic politicization” we explore in Part II. Nevertheless,
there are enough concerning signs of attempted illicit influence by the
President that the episode may be part of a pattern of legal expertise
subordinated to power politics, and merits further inquiry.
E RETALIATION A AINST AUTOMAKERS O ER EFFORTS TO
REDUCE E ICLE REEN OUSE AS EMISSIONS
Elias’ complaint about the politicization of cannabis mergers also
addressed the ATR’s initiation of reviews of four major automakers.145 The
138. Delrahim, supra note 117.
139. Eric Johnson, Full Q&A: Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim talks antitrust on
Recode Decode, VOX (Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/9/1/17807096/makan-delrahimantitrust-att-time-warner-donald-trump-kara-swisher-recode-decode.
140. Id.
141. Johnson, supra note 123.
142. Id.
143. Delrahim, supra note 117.
144. Id.
145. See Testimony of John W. Elias, supra note 8.
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investigations of the automakers were initiated only a day after Trump
tweeted that he was “enraged by the news that the [automakers] would adhere
to higher fuel emissions standards than the federal government demands.”146
Elias argued that the automakers, which held “less than 30% of the market,”
were targeted by the Trump Administration because of their agreement with
California to “reduce vehicle greenhouse gas emissions.”147 Trump’s dismay
stemmed from his own plan to allow for increased emissions.148 California’s
agreements were with BMW, Ford, Honda and Volkswagen, and were
intended to commit the automakers to produce vehicles capable of averaging
50 miles per gallon by 2026.149 By contrast, Trump’s plan asked automakers
to attain only 40 miles per gallon by 2026.150
The ATR’s investigation sought to determine whether the agreement
violated competition laws barring collusion. 151 Yet, Elias’ testimony
described how “[u]nder well-established antitrust precedent, states have wide
latitude to regulate.”152 Furthermore, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine (which
finds its basis in the First Amendment) instructs that companies are free to
“collectively lobby the government for regulation.” 153 Thus, according to
Elias, the agreement should not have raised any antitrust concerns.154 Elias
compared the initiation of the investigation into the automakers with the
investigation into the cannabis mergers, showing how its opening paperwork
“[did] not include a staff ‘recommendation,’” but rather simply stated the
ATR wanted to open an investigation. 155 Elias continued, stating that the
initiation of the investigation was also “generated by the [ATR’s] policy staff,
which does not conduct enforcement investigations of this type.”156
When “news of the investigation became public,” Elias said, ATR
experts familiar with both the “state action” defense as well as the NoerrPennington doctrine questioned the ATR’s decision to “investigat[e] conduct
that appeared to be prompted by a state regulator.”157 According to Elias,
AAG Delrahim attempted to deflect these concerns by holding a staff
meeting in which he asserted that staff was “not rushed into initiating the
investigation.” 158 As it turned out, while the “potential antitrust violation
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Goodman, supra note 14.
Id.
Rebecca Beitsch, DOJ Whistleblower cites Trump tweets as impetus for California
emissions probe, THE HILL (June 23, 2020), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/
504160-doj-whistleblower-sites-trump-tweets-as-impetus-for-investigation.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Testimony of John W. Elias, supra note 8, at 6.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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under investigation was premised on a group (competitor-to-competitor)
agreement,” each of the four automakers had independently entered an
agreement with California—they had not entered as a group.159
Delrahim’s stated justifications for the ATR’s actions partook of theories
of expansive executive power that effectively proved too much—it is hard to
imagine what type of industry/regulatory cooperation they would not cover.
For example, he often repeated the ATR’s right “to investigate any
appearance of collusive conduct,” and the fact that more information was
needed at the outset to determine whether there was, in fact, collusion.160
Delrahim cautioned that “even well-intentioned collusion can still be illegal,”
and thus the request for more information from the automakers was
consistent with ATR duties. 161 Given the scourge of air pollution and
anthropogenic climate change, and the simultaneous proliferation of anticompetitive practices in so many other sectors, it is hard to imagine why any
rational government agency would devote scarce resources to an inquiry
whose most prominent end would be an increase in fossil fuel consumption
and all that brings with it (including exacerbation of climate change and
serious negative health effects for those exposed to excess pollution). All that
is left in response is the formulaic, formalistic assertion that when
competitors “agree with each other on how they will act in the marketplace,
antitrust law enforcers have stepped in and taken a good, hard look.”162
Thus, later stonewalling should not be surprising. Sheldon Whitehouse,
United States Senator for Rhode Island, attempted to elicit more from
Delrahim regarding the basis for the investigations. In September 2019,
Whitehouse asked for information regarding the “origins and motivations of
the investigation” at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing.163 According to
a press release issued by Whitehouse’s office, Delrahim “deflected [Senator
Whitehouse]’s questions and subsequently failed to provide complete written
responses to questions,” although the investigation was closed in February
2019 and “[ATR] policy clearly permit[ted] Delrahim to disclose his reasons
for terminating the investigation.”164
Following the Committee hearing, Whitehouse wrote a letter to Delrahim
requesting supplementary responses to questions that he had not answered at

159. Id.
160. Bryan Koenig, DOJ Antitrust Chief Tells Sens. Carmakers Probe Not ‘Political,’ LAW360
(Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1199420.
161. Id.
162. Bryan Koenig, No ‘Politicization’ of DOJ Probes, Antitrust Chief Says, LAW 360 (Sept 16,
2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1199407/no-politicization-of-doj-probes-antitrust-chiefsays.
163. Press Release, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, Whitehouse Presses Antitrust Head for
Answers on Politicized Investigation of California Fuel Economy Agreement (June 10, 2020),
https://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/news/release/whitehouse-presses-antitrust-head-for-answerson-politicized-investigation-of-california-fuel-economy-agreement.
164. Id.
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the hearing. Senator Whitehouse noted that Delrahim did not identify which
“office or component” of the ATR had first “raised the idea” to investigate,
nor did he answer an inquiry into whether he spoke to the EPA or DOT about
the investigation.165 Apparently, Delrahim also did not respond to a question
regarding whether the ATR had taken into consideration the President’s
tweets regarding the automakers or whether the ATR had even taken any
investigatory steps with regard to the automakers before the President’s first
tweet criticizing the automakers was posted.166 According to Whitehouse’s
letter, Delrahim also failed to identify the specific types of information
reviewed in the case, stating only that the ATR “monitors markets and
receives information from new reports, market participants, and third
parties.”167
F E IDENCE OF AUT ORITARIAN POLITICI ATION
Experts believed that the ATR treated the cannabis mergers in a
politicized way, for the following reasons: (1) the OPR’s letter reviewing the
whistleblowers’ allegations did not interview decision-makers in the
investigation process for improper motive, (2) the sheer number of
investigations issued could not justify the ATR’s contention that it needed
more experience in the cannabis industry, (3) the ATR violated its own
manual when issuing the Second Requests, and (4) the harm posed to
competition was extremely minimal, and (5) the burden on the firms was
vastly disproportionate to the harms possibly prevented by potential
enforcement actions. 168 The DOJ’s responses did little to vindicate their
actions or quell the concerns of the experts given their lack of a legal or
common sense basis, and could be easily refuted by experts.169
Moreover, the cannabis mergers do not represent the only instance where
the DOJ seems to have been motivated politically. In the whistleblower
complaint itself, the issue was raised of whether the DOJ had proper motives
for examining four automakers who had separately entered into agreements
with California. In that case, an irrational enthusiasm for fossil fuel burning
(compounded by long-standing alliances between fossil fuel interests and the
Republican Party) seemed far more explanatory than any genuine
competitive concerns. In a similarly Trumpist vein, the DOJ quickly
approved a Disney-Fox merger, which stood in contrast to its nearly two-year
investigation and failed lawsuit attempting to block the AT&T/Time Warner
merger. While a closer call than the automotive and cannabis situations, the
differential treatment still raises the red flag of politicization, grounded in
Trump’s own increasingly unhinged words and actions (calling, for instance,
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See The Editorial Board, supra note 109.
See Sprigman supra note 39.
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one of the divisions of the firms involved “dumb b*stards,” part of his endless
stream of invective).
We will of course never be privy to the exact conversations that led to
each of the troubling investigations above. Incompetence or caprice may
explain as much as the malevolent will to power so common in authoritarian
regimes. Nevertheless, the episodes are reminiscent of a scene in Angels in
America, which fictionally portrays one of Donald Trump’s earliest
attorneys, Roy Cohn, who had many connections to the right by the 1980s.170
In one scene of the play, where Cohn is desperately trying to avoid being
disbarred in New York, he explains to a young attorney he is mentoring (and
trying to corruptly influence), why the young attorney should take a job in
the Department of Justice:
R : Very fancy lawyers, these disbarment committee lawyers, fancy
lawyers with fancy corporate clients and complicated cases. Antitrust suits.
Deregulation…Complex cases like these need Justice Department
cooperation like flowers need the sun. Wouldn’t you say that’s an accurate
assessment, Martin?
M
R

: I’m not here, Roy. I’m not hearing any of this.
: No. Of course not.

Without the light of the sun…these cases, and the fancy lawyers who
represent them, will wither and die.

A well-placed friend, someone in the Justice Department, can turn off the
sun. Cast a deep shadow on my behalf. Make them shiver in the cold. If they
overstep. They would fear that.171
Though the portrayal is fictional, it is exceptionally acute in its
suggestion of the type of wink-wink, nod-nod, sotto voce deal making and
influence that become an all-too-plausible explanation for Trump-era
administrative action without adequate or consistent support in law or facts.
The corruption of Trump himself is beyond dispute. Martin’s “I’m not
hearing any of this” is reminiscent of the shreds of plausible deniability
cobbled together in so many instances of ATR’s responses to the
resoundingly consistent and widespread condemnation of its actions from
experts. Cohn is largely remembered as one of the most malevolent
characters in American history, and has been called a key mentor of
Trump’s.172 And there is little doubt that a person of Trump’s character would
170. Cohn defended Trump against 1970s Justice Department allegations that Trump’s family
real estate business discriminated against African-American renters. Bruce Handy, A Roy Cohn
Boomlet: How the Trump Era Gave Us Dueling Documentaries, VANITY FAIR (Sept. 25, 2019),
171. TONY KUSHNER, ANGELS IN AMERICA 70 (2013).
172. Stuart Miller, Blame lawyer Roy Cohn for Donald Trump’s nasty political tactics,
documentary says, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 29, 2019 (Donald Trump “embraced Cohn as a mentor
and relied on him as a lawyer for more than a decade starting in the 1970s. Echoes of Cohn’s
antagonistic style can still be heard in Trump’s choleric rally speeches.”).
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search for, and be particularly pleased by, appointees who acquiesced to a
pattern of policies entirely consistent with an authoritarian politicization of
core functions of the agencies they served in. This is a type of politicization
that future competition law and policy must avoid—and courts should be
particularly suspicious of cases in which it arises.
II DEMOCRATIC ASPECTS OF LATE
POLITICI ATION

S ANTITRUST S

The authoritarian politicization of antitrust is not the only competition
law story of the Trump era, however. There was simultaneously an increasing
willingness of both federal and state antitrust authorities to move beyond a
narrow approach to competition policy in order to democratize their
understanding of harm and larger social concerns raised by corporate
concentration. This is a positive politicization, enabling better responses to
pressing public concerns and distributing the type of power that authoritarian
antitrust policy aspires to concentrate.
Since the 1960s, attorneys have tended to cede ground to economists and
econometricians in antitrust policy. Establishment figures have generally
assumed this to be progress, from rhetoric to (the rule of) reason; from the
vagueness of words to the clarity of numbers; and from the instability of
politics to the stable order of expertise. 173 However, many results of this
change in regulation and enforcement have been grimly counterproductive.
Concentration has risen. 174 Purported merger efficiencies, “validated” by
well-paid quantitative experts, have vanished into thin air175—the vaporware
of sponsored social science.176
Historical trends have exacerbated these problems. The global financial
crisis of 2008 only strengthened the largest banks. 177 The financial crisis

173. See Frank Pasquale, Professional Judgment in an Era of Artificial Intelligence and Machine
Learning, 46 (1) BOUNDARY 2 73 (2019) (discussing the connection between neoliberalism and
quantification in policy).
174. See THOMAS PHILIPPON, THE GREAT REVERSAL: HOW AMERICA GAVE UP ON FREE
MARKETS (2019).
175. JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A RETROSPECTIVE
ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY 84–86 (2015); JOHN KWOKA, CONTROLLING MERGERS AND MARKET
POWER: A PROGRAM FOR REVIVING ANTITRUST IN AMERICA (2020).
176. On the problem of experts influenced by funding sources, see PHILIP MIROWSKI, SCIENCEMART: PRIVATIZING AMERICAN SCIENCE (2011) (discussing sponsored research).
177. See A Decade After the Great Recession, Is the Global Financial System Safer?, WHARTON
SCH. U. PA. (Sep. 11, 2018), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/ten-years-greatrecession-global-financial-system-safer/ (noting that reforms after the financial crisis “have
unquestionably enhanced the capital strength of most banks and reduced their vulnerability to a
liquidity crisis”); see also Renae Merle, A guide to the financial crisis–10 years later, WASH. POST
(Sep. 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/a-guide-to-the-financialcrisis—10-years-later/2018/09/10/114b76ba-af10-11e8-a20b-5f4f84429666_story.html (“[M]any
of the country’s biggest banks are bigger now than they were before the financial crisis. JPMorgan
Chase has $2.5 trillion in assets, compared with $1.5 trillion in 2007. Bank of America has about
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caused by COVID-19 is accelerating massive technology firms’ plans to
control vast swathes of the economy, pushing their CEOs’ and top
shareholders’ wealth to stratospheric levels. 178 Austerity combined with
maladministration of the CARES Act have promised to make 2020’s GDP
collapse an extinction-level event for thousands of small businesses, further
driving concentration of economic activity into the largest firms.179 In this
context, constituent demands for more robust protection of small and
medium-sized enterprises from the depredations of massive firms were
becoming impossible for political appointees to ignore. They were also
repeatedly validated in the relevant academic literature. This combination of
public voice and a democratization of competition law expertise resulted in
a democratic politicization of high technology antitrust.
A T E OUSE REPORT S ISION OF A MORE DEMOCRATIC
ECONOMY
As 2020 House of Representatives Antitrust Hearings showed, there is
growing political interest in righting economic imbalances and
inequalities. 180 Representatives from around the U.S. are not keen on
watching local businesses wither and die as they pay higher and higher
tributes to Amazon to appear on the firm’s “marketplace,” or compete against
Amazon’s self-preferred brands. 181 Nor are other tech giants likely to be
portrayed as heroic innovators any longer, as the press gradually witnesses
its revenues diverted to monopolistic advertising platforms.

$2.3 trillion in assets, compared with $1.7 trillion in 2007. The assets of Wells Fargo are near $2
trillion, more than double what they were right before the crisis.”).
178. “People like Jeff Bezos, Elon Musk, and Steve Ballmer have added tens of billions of dollars
to their net worths since the beginning of the calendar year.” See Theodore Schleifer, Silicon
Valley’s richest are getting richer just as the pandemic is getting worse, VOX (July 21, 2020),
https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/7/21/21332166/tech-billionaires-wealth-elon-musk-steveballmer-jeff-bezos-pandemic-covid.
179. See Emily Flitter, ‘I Can’t Keep Doing This:’ Small-Business Owners Are Giving Up, N.Y.
TIMES (July 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/13/business/small-businessescoronavirus.html (“Researchers at Harvard . . . estimat[e] that nearly 110,000 small businesses . . .
decided to shut down permanently.”); see also James Kwak, The End of Small Business, WASH.
POST (July 9, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/07/09/after-covid-19-giantcorporations-chains-may-be-only-ones-left/?arc404=true (explaining how the COVID-fueled
economic crisis is “further increasing corporate concentration” as spending is being pushed online
where “the e-commerce sector is dominated by so few players.”).
180. See Sarah Miller, Last Week’s Big Tech Antitrust Hearings Sent an Unmistakable Message:
Change Is In the Air for America’s Corporate Giants, THE APPEAL (Aug. 6, 2020),
https://theappeal.org/last-weeks-big-tech-antitrust-hearings-sent-an-unmistakable-messagechange-is-in-the-air-for-americas-corporate-giants/ (“[T]he committee signaled an unprecedented
desire to break with . . . the 197s-era, hands-off antitrust ideology . . . [that] helped bestow these
titans of tech with such extraordinary power.”).
181. Stacy Mitchell, Ron Knox, & Zach Freed, Report: Amazon’s Monopoly Tollbooth, INST. FOR
LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE 2-3 (July 28, 2020), https://ilsr.org/amazons_tollbooth/.
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Many books published recently solidified these intellectual shifts in the
field. 182 A comprehensive House Antitrust Subcommittee report (House
Report) demonstrated legislative interest in reforming the law.183 Based on
1.3 million internal documents and communications from massive firms,
interviews with more than 240 market participants, and submissions from 38
antitrust experts, the House Report promoted an exceptionally democratized
vision of the future of economic development in the U.S. Its
recommendations included:
Structural separations to prohibit platforms from operating in lines
of business that depend on or interoperate with the platform;
Prohibiting platforms from engaging in self-preferencing;
Requiring platforms to make its services compatible with
competing networks to allow for interoperability and data
portability;
Mandating that platforms provide due process before taking action
against market participants;
Establishing a standard to proscribe strategic acquisitions that
reduce competition.184
As legal theorists like Sabeel Rahman have argued, these are first steps
toward an economy where small and medium sized enterprises have a chance
to develop some level of autonomy.185 Without such interventions, economic
power becomes more pyramidal rather than distributed.186 Moreover, looking
to the future deployment of AI and robotics in the economy as the most
advanced modes of production, it is essential to decentralize control so that
professions of domain experts are able to wield power, enabling the labor
they represent to co-govern technological deployment.187

182. The books include: DAVID DAYEN, MONOPOLIZED: LIFE IN THE AGE OF CORPORATE POWER
(2020); SALLY HUBBARD, MONOPOLIES SUCK: 7 WAYS BIG CORPORATIONS RULE YOUR LIFE AND
HOW TO TAKE BACK CONTROL (2020); BARRY C. LYNN, LIBERTY FROM ALL MASTERS: THE NEW
AMERICAN AUTOCRACY VS THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (2020); MATTHEW STOLLER, GOLIATH: THE
100-YEAR WAR BETWEEN MONOPOLY POWER AND DEMOCRACY (2019); ZEPHYR TEACHOUT,
BREAK ‘EM UP: RECOVERING OUR FREEDOM FROM BIG AG, BIG TECH, AND BIG MONEY (2020);
MAURICE STUCKE & ARIEL EZRACHI, COMPETITION OVERDOSE (2020).
183. Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets, MAJORITY STAFF REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST, COMMERCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2020),
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/competition_in_digital_markets.pdf.
184. Press Release, House Committee on the Judiciary, Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee
Investigation Reveals Digital Economy Highly Concentrated, Impacted By Monopoly Power (Oct.
6, 2020)
https://judiciary.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=3429.
185. See K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the
Revival of the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621 (2019).
186. FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL
MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015).
187. FRANK PASQUALE, NEW LAWS OF ROBOTICS: DEFENDING HUMAN EXPERTISE IN THE AGE
OF AI (2020).
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An emerging Neo-Brandeisian school of antitrust is promoting forms of
competition law that are better for both consumers and producers, and more
determinate than the economism of mainstream U.S. antitrust (thus
alleviating some of the justified concerns about indeterminacy that dominant
approaches have caused). This movement is critical to advancing and
improving a U.S. economy which has been justly criticized as uncompetitive
and exploitative. 188 While its ideals are still only starting to emerge in
Congress and state legislatures, federal agencies have recently proven to be
far more active now in enforcing antitrust laws with respect to the largest
Silicon Valley firms than they have been in many years. While popular
discontent had been brewing for years, the dam finally broke in late 2020,
when several important interventions signaled a practical revival of U.S.
antitrust law.189
FTC, DO , AND STATE ATTORNEYS ENERAL CONFRONT T E
POWER OF LAR E TEC NOLO Y FIRMS
First, the FTC filed one of most devastating antitrust complaints in its
history against Facebook. 190 The complaint was bipartisan, signed by the
Republican Chairman and two Democratic Commissioners of the FTC. The
FTC accused the social networking giant of monopolization. The social
network space was contestable in the 2000s: Friendster was displaced by
Myspace, and Myspace was in turn dethroned by Facebook.191 Then Mark
Zuckerberg and his upper management team aimed to consolidate their
position, the complaint alleges, by eliminating competition:
Since toppling early rival Myspace and achieving monopoly power,
Facebook has turned to playing defense through anticompetitive means.
After identifying two significant competitive threats to its dominant
position—Instagram and WhatsApp—Facebook moved to squelch those
threats by buying the companies, reflecting CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s view,
expressed in a 2008 email, that “it is better to buy than compete.” To further
entrench its position, Facebook has also imposed anticompetitive conditions
that restricted access to its valuable platform—conditions that Facebook
personnel recognized as “anti user[,]” “hypocritical” in light of Facebook’s

188. THOMAS PHILIPPON, THE GREAT REVERSAL: HOW AMERICA GAVE UP ON FREE MARKETS
9 (2019).
189. See Complaint, FTC v. Facebook, Inc., FTC Matter/File No. 191 0134 (D.D.C. 2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/1910134fbcomplaint.pdf [hereinafter FTC v.
Facebook Complaint]; Complaint, U.S. v. Google (D.D.C. 2020) (No. 1:20-cv-03010),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1328941/download [hereinafter U.S. v. Google
Complaint].
190. See FTC v. Facebook Complaint, supra note 189.
191. Gil Press, Why Facebook Triumphed Over All Other Social Networks, FORBES (Apr. 8,
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2018/04/08/why-facebook-triumphed-over-all-othersocial-networks/?sh=1cf452246e91.
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purported mission of enabling sharing, and a signal that “we’re scared that
we can’t compete on our own merits.”192

As one commentator noted, Facebook’s “buy or bury” approach to
potential rivals “harks back to the tactics used by Standard Oil and the
railroads at the dawn of the 20th century that were found to be illegal.”193 The
FTC also contemplates in the complaint the full scope of remedies necessary
to “restore the competition that would exist absent the conduct alleged in the
Complaint,” including the breakup of Facebook Blue, WhatsApp, and
Instagram into independent businesses, “including, to the extent reasonably
necessary, the provision of ongoing support or services from Facebook to one
or more viable and independent business(es).”194
Not to be outdone, the Department of Justice, joined by eleven largely
conservative states (Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, South Carolina, and Texas), sued
Google in November 2020, alleging that Google unlawfully maintains
“monopolies in the markets for general search services, search advertising,
and general search text advertising in the United States through
anticompetitive and exclusionary practices.” 195 The complaint highlighted
exclusionary agreements, including what it characterized as “tying
arrangements,” as an anticompetitive practice used by Google to dominate
“distribution channels and block rivals.”196 The central idea behind the suit is
that Google is able to lock up the market for search advertising, thereby
extracting higher prices for advertisements (and, indirectly, to raise the prices
of the goods and services whose sale funds those advertisements). 197 The

192. FTC v. Facebook Complaint, supra note 189, at 2.
193. Steve Pearlstein, Facebook and Google cases are our last chance to save the economy from
monopolization, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020
/12/18/google-facebook-antitrust-lawsuit/.
194. FTC v. Facebook Complaint, supra note 189, at 51. “Facebook Blue” is what the social
network commonly known merely as Facebook, is often called within the firm Facebook itself, to
distinguish the flagship social network from the company itself. Id. at 2. As of Dec. 1, 2020,
Wikipedia lists 88 acquisitions by Facebook. List of mergers and acquisitions by Facebook,
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_mergers_and_acquisitions_by_Facebook (last
updated Dec. 31, 2020).
195. See U.S. v. Google Complaint, supra note 189, at 2. California has asked to be joined to the
case as of late December 2020. California is the first Democratic state to ask to join DOJ lawsuit
against Google, CNBC (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/11/california-asks-to-joindoj-lawsuit-against-google.html.
196. U.S. v. Google Complaint, supra note 189. “Google pays billions of dollars each year to
distributors—including popular-device manufacturers such as Apple, LG, Motorola, and Samsung;
major U.S. wireless carriers such as AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon; and browser developers such
as Mozilla, Opera, and UCWeb— to secure default status for its general search engine and, in many
cases, to specifically prohibit Google’s counterparties from dealing with Google’s competitors.” Id.
197. See Brent Kendall & Rob Copeland, Justice Department Hits Google With Antitrust Lawsuit,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-to-file-long-awaitedantitrust-suit-against-google-11603195203.
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illicit profits thereby generated allow Google to pay off entities that could
ensure more competition.198
Antitrust experts suggest this way of modelling the entire apparatus is a
particularly effective way of ensuring intermediaries and middlemen can
extract more value from advertisers (and thus consumers) generally. 199
Imagine, for instance, a more competitive search ecology, where several
search engines vied for advertisers, users, and prime space afforded by OS
vendors, wireless carriers, and browser developers. In that scenario,
advertisers and users would have more choices. Advertisers could shop
around for better search advertising deals. Users might find a more robustly
comprehensive and more privacy-protective search engine. Instead, in the
current situation, the dominant search engine (Google) and the OS vendors,
wireless carriers, and browser developers (where it is found) appear to be in
a symbiotic relationship, in order to take advantage of advertisers and
consumers. The more Google can extract from users and advertisers, the
more it can pay bonuses to OS vendors, wireless carriers, and browser
developers.
It is not only OS vendors, wireless carriers, and browser developers that
Google appears to be working with in exclusionary ways to stop competition.
The Texas Attorney General (along with several other states) has released an
explosive (albeit redacted) complaint alleging something akin to bid-rigging
in the relationship between Facebook and Google.200 The complaint alleges:
Facebook curtailed its involvement with header bidding in return for Google
giving Facebook information, speed, and other advantages in the auctions
that Google runs for publishers’ mobile app advertising inventory each
month in the United States. In these auctions, Facebook and Google
compete head-to-head as bidders. Google’s internal codename for this
agreement, signed at the highest-level, was…a twist on the character name
from Star Wars. The parties [are] literally manipulating the auction . . . .201

198. See id. (“The government alleged that Google uses billions of dollars collected from
advertisements on its platform to pay for mobile-phone manufacturers, carriers and browsers . . . to
maintain Google as their preset, default search engine, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of
dominance.”).
199. ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE PROMISE AND PERILS
OF THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY (2016). This book includes several modeling scenarios for
predation, drawing on ecological metaphors.
200. Complaint, Texas v. Google LLC (E.D. Tex. 2020) (No. 1:20-cv-03010), https://www.
texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/images/admin/2020/Press/20201216%20
COMPLAINT_REDACTED.pdf [hereinafter Texas v. Google Complaint]; see John Newman
@johnmarknewman (Dec. 16, 2020, 4:16 PM), https://twitter.com/johnmarknewman/status/13393
18630211710976 (discussing bid rigging); see also Price Fixing, Bid Rigging and Market
Allocation Schemes: What They Are and What to Look For, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, https://www.
justice.gov/atr/price-fixing-bid-rigging-and-market-allocation-schemes (last updated June 25,
2015).
201. Texas v. Google Complaint, supra note 200, at 6.
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A former advertising executive, Dina Srinavasan, informed the
complaint with her industry experience and rigorous legal analysis.202 The
complaint directly ties the alleged misbehavior to potential consumer harms.
As the complaint alleges, “Google now uses its immense market power to
extract a very high tax [on] the ad dollars otherwise flowing to the countless
online publishers and content producers like online newspapers, cooking
websites, and blogs who survive by selling advertisements on their websites
and apps. These costs invariably are passed onto the advertisers themselves
and then to American consumers.”203 The Texas lawsuit has alleged unfair
exclusionary contracts; as Shoshana Wodinsky explains, it alleges that
“Google’s tools for advertisers mandate that any people trying to buy ad
space across the vast Google Display Network exclusively use Google’s
exchange to do so—even if third-party exchanges were offering access to
identical ad space” for less.204
Another state-led lawsuit featured an even wider array of support than
the Texas case. Colorado Attorney General Phil Weiser (an expert on
technology law with a distinguished scholarly record) now leads a 46-state
antitrust lawsuit against Google. The complaint’s allegations went beyond
the U.S. Department of Justice-led case, and were stark:
Google, one of the largest companies in the world, has methodically
undertaken actions to entrench and reinforce its general search services and
search-related advertising monopolies by stifling competition. As the
gateway to the internet, Google has systematically degraded the ability of
other companies to access consumers. In doing so, just as Microsoft
improperly maintained its monopoly through conduct directed at Netscape,
Google has improperly maintained and extended its search-related
monopolies through exclusionary conduct that has harmed consumers,
advertisers, and the competitive process itself. Google, moreover, cannot
establish business justifications or procompetitive benefits sufficient to
justify its exclusionary conduct in any relevant market.205

The complaint specifically alleges three tactics. First, the complaint
alleges that Google “uses its massive financial resources to limit the number
of consumers who use a Google competitor,” focusing in particular on its

202. Daisuke Wakabayashi, The Antitrust Case Against Big Tech, Shaped by Tech Industry
Exiles, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/20/technology/antitrustcase-google-facebook.html; see Dina Srinivasan, Why Google Dominates Advertising Markets:
Competition Policy Should lean on the Principles of Financial Market Regulation, 25 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 55 (2020); see Dina Srinivasan, The Antitrust Case Against Facebook, 16(1) BERKELEY
BUS. L. J. (2019).
203. Texas v. Google Complaint, supra note 200, at 7.
204. Shoshana Wodinsky, How Google Ruined the Internet (According to Texas), GIZMODO
(Dec. 17, 2020), https://gizmodo.com/how-google-ruined-the-internet-according-to-texas-184590
2795.
205. Complaint, Colorado v. Google, (D.D.C. 2020), https://assets.documentcloud.org/
documents/20431671/colorado-v-google.pdf.
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massive annual payments to Apple to make Google the default search engines
on iPhones.206 Alphabet, Google’s parent company, of course owns the main
rival OS to that of Apple in the U.S. mobile phone duopoly, Android.207 Put
the two together, add in the type of self-reinforcing data advantages that have
been accumulating since the 2000s, and Google has a very effective
chokepoint on much of the internet. Second, Google operates its s Search Ads
360 exchange (SA360), the “single largest such tool used by advertisers—to
severely limit the tool’s interoperability with a competitor, thereby
disadvantaging SA360 advertisers.” 208 Third, “Google throttles consumers
from bypassing its general search engine and going directly to their chosen
destination, especially when those destinations threaten Google’s monopoly
power.”209 This third point is dramatically illustrated in the Complaint, as it
shows how much of the typical search page is now plastered with Google
advertising and leads, as opposed to the less biased organic results that
delighted consumers when Google was less monopolistic, and actually had
to worry about competition.210
Each of these cases reflect over a decade of academic work and activism
to bring the harms of large internet firms to the attention of antitrust
authorities. Experts may disagree as to their ultimate merits. But they clearly
do not reflect the self-serving, authoritarian agenda of an autocratic regime
trying to punish its political enemies and helps its friends. Diverse states,
ranging from California to Mississippi, backed various lawsuits. The FTC
Complaint against Facebook was bipartisan. And the Trump Administration
and its conservative allies have put together extraordinarily powerful digital
political machines via Facebook and Google’s YouTube.
These often bipartisan complaints reflect a form of cooperation all-toorare in today’s politics: Democratic and Republican politicians who have
heard concerns about large technology firms from experts, civil society
advocates, and their constituents, and who are acting responsively to this
confluence of the critical wings of activist publics, and the activist wings of
critical publics. 211 This democratic politicization, properly constrained by
norms of legal regularity and deference to experts, is exactly the type of
democratization necessary to revitalize competition law and policy in the 21st
century.

206. Complaint at 7, Colorado v. Google, (D.D.C. 2020), https://assets.documentcloud.org/
documents/20431671/colorado-v-google.pdf [hereinafter Colorado v. Google Complaint].
207. Alejandro Alba, A list – from A to Z – of all the companies, brands Google’s alphabet
currently owns, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 11, 2015), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/zlist-brands-companies-google-alphabet-owns-article-1.2321981.
208. Colorado v. Google Complaint, supra note 205, at 8.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 13-14.
211. The language of “critical” and “activist” publics is drawn from NANCY FRASER, UNRULY
PRACTICES: POWER, DISCOURSE AND GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY (1994).
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III CONCLUSION: TWO FACES OF POLITICS IN ANTITRUST
A new social science of optimal corporate size is necessary—and it will
need to be informed by popular concern about concentration in the economy.
As this new social science is built and applied, we must bear in mind Maurice
Stucke’s still-relevant critiques of mainstream approaches to antitrust:
Prevailing competition advocacy glosses over four fundamental questions:
First, what is competition? Second, what are the goals of a competition
policy? Third, how does one achieve, if one can, the objectives of such
desired competition? Fourth, how does one know if the economy is
progressing toward these goals?212

After surveying considerable diversity of opinion on the definition of
“competition,” Stucke argues that it cannot be an “end in itself,” but might
better be thought of as “a policy tool to achieve broader government
objectives for the economy.”213 These objectives include much more than
gross measures of “consumer welfare” or “wealth maximization.” 214 The
goals of competition policy are necessarily diverse, and Stucke suggests that
it is deeply unwise to try to subordinate all its objectives to one overriding
end:
Other than for an idealist, competition policy cannot be reduced
meaningfully to a single goal. It is the essence of the economic problem that
the making of an economic plan involves the choice between conflicting or
competing ends–different needs of different people. Competition officials,
ultimately, must recognize the existence of multiple goals and values.215

To overcome short-termism, we not only need better social science, but
also better political discussions, asking voters for more engaged attention to
the ways in which the economy is not serving labor and consumers, and how
it might do better. Political demands by, say, newspapers for more ad revenue
for their struggling industry, or by content moderators for better wages, or by
marketplace sellers for more fair terms from the platform they operate on, are
exactly the type of concerns that antitrust policy ought to address. When these
demands filter up, in a bottom-up manner from constituents, and via
independent researchers, they are exactly the type of political influence that
a democratic system of government is supposed to reflect. Moreover, in the
instances of democratic politicization of antitrust that have been surveyed in
this article, all were procedurally regular and well within the bounds of
precedent and agency practice. This democratization of the politics of
antitrust is very promising.
212. Maurice E. Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, 82(3) ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 951, 953
(2008).
213. Id. at 988 (internal quotations omitted).
214. See id.
215. Id. at 999 (internal quotations omitted).Stucke’s views reflect classic analyses of
incommensurability. See DOUGLAS KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE (2006).
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However, the politics of antitrust must not be based on a mere personal
animus against certain persons or firms, however popular the exponent of that
animus, lest competition agencies become tools of authoritarians. However
well-grounded the ATR approach to the AT&T/Time Warner merger may
have been, Trump’s attacks on CNN, directly in the context of the merger,
were reminiscent of autocrats’ aspirations to control the media by any means
at hand. Nor were ATR’s efforts to burden cannabis firms an authentic
reflection of what antitrust law demands. Even if the cause were more
popular, multiple experts observed that it lacked grounding in legal
authorities for second requests. Legal regularity, politics, and expertise are
the foundations of the administrative state, and none can be ignored. 216
Neither authoritarian approaches to politics, nor the politicization
unconstrained by legal regularity and expertise which they permit and
promote, should be a part of competition law and policy.

216. Peter H. Schuck, Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law, and Politics, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y
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